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It is lovely to be invited for a third time to New Zealand, where so many
interesting steps have been taken to make the economy more efficient, despite
the limited local demand that leads to many markets being concentrated. It has
been a great pleasure to be welcomed by new colleagues at the university and to
meet again Jack Hodder, who contributed so markedly to my LL.M. seminars in
London in the year dot minus 3. I am delighted and gratified to meet such an
august and knowledgeable audience here, although somewhat intimidated by the
thought that I know so little of your law and of your markets.
Introduction
There is concern in many jurisdictions that firms found to enjoy
substantial market power may be under a special responsibility to grant to their
competitors access to essential facilities. Where a firm enjoying market power
                                          
1 Chapman Tripp Fellow at the Victoria University of Wellington and Professor Emeritus of
Competition Law at University College London.
This article is a revised version of a talk given at the offices of Chapman Tripp on
November 30, 1999.
I am indebted not only to Chapman Tripp and the Victoria University of Wellington
for encouraging me to write up in the form of an article the presentation I gave, and for
constructive discussions and help in finding material. I am also grateful to the Queensland
University of Technology for making their library available to me over the New Year and to
many people for conversations about the importance of not reducing incentives to investment.
My greatest debt is to Dr. Maureen Brunt who suggested several cases, at which I
should look and made extremely constructive comments about an early draft of this article.
None of these friends have seen the final version and cannot be responsible for it.
2has some asset which a new entrant to a concentrated market must have or use, it
is tempting to say that the market would operate better if the new comer were
entitled to access. On a static analysis, this may be true – there will be one more
firm in the market: probably, more will be produced and sold at lower prices. On
a dynamic analysis, however, it is important, that the incentive to create the
original asset be not reduced The reduction in the incentive to invest in other
specific facilities in other industries may be more important than the static
improvement in a particular market.
I am concerned by the propensity of antitrust authorities to take the static
view and require access to be granted at a price at which the incumbent would
prefer not to deal, thereby reducing the incentive to the original investment. The
particular investment will already have been made, but if antitrust authorities
frequently compel access for the benefit of free riders wishing to compete
downstream, the incentive to investment in facilities essential to other activities
will be reduced.
New Zealand competition law was inspired directly by that of Australia as
part of the arrangements for the CER and, in its turn, the Australian trade
practices legislation was largely inspired by the experience in the US and
European Community.2
Under s. 2 of the Sherman Act in the USA, some of the cases went very
far in finding that a firm with substantial market power was under a duty to grant
access to essential facilities for the benefit of those wishing to compete with it
downstream.  Professor Areeda’s seminal article, `Essential Facilities: an Epithet
in Need of Limiting Principles,’3 has helped to stem the tide.  Even where more
than one person can conveniently use the facility, there are objections to
requiring access. An obligation to supply not only reduces the incentive to make
                                          
2 See the excerpt I quoted from the first Port Nelson case in note 15 below.
3  58 Antitrust law journal 841. See also Areeda-Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of
Antitrust principles and their Application, vol. 3A paras. 771-774.
3the original investment, it also reduces the incentive to duplicate or improve it
where this would otherwise be sensible. Moreover, some body will have to settle
the amount of compensation to be paid often on a continuing basis.
Areeda concluded with 6 principles:
1.  compulsory access should be very exceptional,
2. a facility held by a single firm is ‘essential’ only when a) it is
critical to the plaintiff’s competitive vitality and b) the plaintiff is essential for
competition in a market,
3. access should  be required only if it would increase competition by
reducing price or increasing output or innovation. This is unlikely a) when it
would chill desirable activity, b) the plaintiff is not a competitor, actual or
potential, c) the plaintiff merely substitutes for the monopolist or d) when the
monopolist already had the usual privilege of charging the monopoly price for
its resources,
4. Even when these conditions are satisfied, denial of access is never
per se unlawful. A legitimate business purpose saves the defendant. It is for the
defendant to come up with a justification, but for the plaintiff to establish that it
is insufficient,
5.  The defendant’s intention is rarely illuminating, as every firm that
denies access to a rival does so to limit competition.4 Only exclusion by
improper means should be restrained,
6.  No remedy should require access on terms which the court cannot
adequately explain or supervise.
The US courts now seldom require access.5
                                          
4 See the views of the Privy Council in Clear v. Telecom Corp, text to note 38 below.
5 See below the long quotation from Posner J. in Olympia by the High Court in Clear v.
Telecoms, text to note .38 below. The recent US cases were discussed by Donald Baker in ?
Ehlermann & Laudati, European Competition Law Annual 1998, Hart Publishing.
4Australian precedents
Queensland Wire
The New Zealand cases under section 36 of the Commerce Act  of 1986
start from the Australian precedent of Queensland Wire,6 decided under section
46 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974.7  BHP produced some 97% of steel
products and supplied 85% of them. In Australia, it was the only producer in
Australia and almost the only supplier of Y bar, from which it made star pickets
for rural fencing. It refused to supply Y-bar to Queensland Wire, which
competed downstream, except at a price alleged to be excessive. The issue was
whether this amounted to taking advantage of a substantial degree of power in a
market for one of the prohibited purposes.8
In the Federal Court, Pincus J. denied that there was a breach of section
36 on the ground that BHP’s conduct was not reprehensible. The Full Federal
court held that there was no market for Y-bar, over which BHP held market
power, since it had never been sold.9 Both these views were rejected by the High
Court.
It has since been held that there must be a causal connection between the
market power and the conduct. In Natwest Australia Bank Ltd. v. Boral Garrard
Strapping Systems Pty Ltd,10 French J. had struck out a statement of claim under
                                          
6 (1989) 83 ALR 577. I have simplified the facts: BHP supplied the Y-bar to a wholly owned
subsidiary that made the star pickets.
7 As amended, section 46 provides:
‘(1) A corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market shall not take
advantage of that power for the purpose of –
(a) eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor of the corporation . . .
in that or any other market;
(b)  preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market; or
 deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in that
or any other market.’
8 Per Mason C.J. and Wilson, at p. 584, line 30,
9 This view is hard to reconcile with Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd. (1976)
8 ALR 481, 517, line 17, where the Trade Practices Tribunal  described a market as a place
where actual or potential transactions may take place.
10 (1992) 111 ALR 631, ATPR 41-196.
5s. 36 because there was no causal link between a refusal to supply and the
alleged market power.
Mason CJ and Wilson J said:
‘In effectively refusing to supply Y-bar to the appellant, BHP is
taking advantage of its substantial market power. It is only by virtue of its
control of the market and the absence of other suppliers that BHP can
afford, in a commercial sense, to withhold Y-bar from the appellant. If
BHP lacked that market power – in other words, if it were operating in a
competitive market – it is highly unlikely that it would stand by, without
any effort to compete and allow the appellant to secure its supply of Y-
Bar from a competitor.’ (p. 585, lines 47 – p. 586, line 3.)
The High Court rejected the moral interpretation of the Act adopted by
Pincus J. in favour of one based on competition for the benefit of consumers.11
Dawson J,12 however, went further and tried to distinguish competition on the
merits from other exclusionary conduct.
‘The difficulty in determining what conduct constitutes taking
advantage of market power and what does not, stems inevitably from the
need to distinguish between monopolistic practices, which are prohibited,
and vigorous competition, which is not. Both here and in the United
States the search continues for a satisfactory basis upon which to make
the distinction. For the most part, all that emerges are synonyms, which
are not particularly helpful. Words such as “normal methods of industrial
development”, “honestly industrial”, “anti-competitive”, “predatory” or
“exclusionary conduct” merely beg the question.’13
                                          
11 E.g., Mason C.J. and Wilson J. at p. 585, line 6, Deane J. at 587 lines 8-11 and 21 - 37,
Toohey J. p. 600 lines 14 – 16 and 602 lines 46-51.
12 At p. 593. See also Toohey J.’s quotation form Donald and Heyden, p. 601, lines 16 – 20
and 602, lines 15 - 20
13 See also Toohey J. at p. 601, line 15, where he quotes Donald  and Heydon. Trade Practices
Law: Restrictive Trade Practices, Deceptive Conduct and Consumer Protection, p.221,
6The best way of ousting a competitor is to provide better bargains for
consumers than it does. Those better bargains are the objective of competition
law. Such conduct may be exclusionary, but it would be ironical to condemn it.
In all three systems – US, Australian14 and New Zealand15 - there are many
                                                                                                                                
`There is a stock distinction in discussing monopolisation legislation between
predation and competition; between unfair rivalry and fair rivalry; between relying on
one’s market control and relying on one’s efficiency; . . . and between deliberateness
and the unexpected.’
Efficiently producing what consumers want to buy may however be deliberate. In my
view, the helpful reference is to efficiency.
 See also Toohey J. at p. 602, line 15.
14 E.g., Queensland Wire, per Mason C.J. and Wilson J. at p. 585, line 6.
15 In Tru Tone Ltd v. Festival Records Retail Marketing Ltd. [1988] 2 NZLR 354,358,
Richardson J. said,
‘In terms of the Long Title the Commerce Act is an Act to promote
competition in market in New Zealand, It is based on the premise that society’s
resources are best allocated in a competitive market where rivalry between firms
ensures maximum efficiency in the use of resources.
These two interrelated elements of competition in markets are crucial
considerations under both s. 36 and s. 27’
The first paragraph of this important statement of the attitude of the Court of Appeal was
quoted by McGechan J and Gair Blunt in  Union Shipping v. Port Nelson Ltd. [1990] 2 NZLR
662, 699 line 54. They went on to say:
‘It is the permission of competition which the Court is directed to foster.
Parliament, as a matter of policy, has decided benefits will flow from that course.
Whether such is a correct economic or social analysis is not a matter for the Court.
Within that objective, the particular objectives of ss. 27 and 36 are clear.  . . .Section
36, following in the footsteps of a tradition at least as old as the Sherman Act (USC 15
ss 1 – 7) recognises that even in competitive markets dominant positions do arise
which in the end can generate anti-competitive activity. Accordingly it is intended to
prohibit the use of such dominant position within a market for serious anti-competitive
purposes. Such provisions are directed at the protection of the concept of competition
as such. They are not directed at the protection of individual competitors, except in so
far as the latter may promote the former. In the trade practices area, the 1986 Act
clearly follows in a general way a number of approaches adopted in Australia under
the Trade Practices Act 1974, which in turn in some areas pick up principles developed
under United States Antitrust legislation. Developments and approaches in those
jurisdictions can be kept in mind accordingly. The legislation to no small extent breaks
new ground, reflecting the increasing complexity and maturity of the commercial
environment in this country in recent decades, and the demands which that has
imposed. It is legislation of a type where the Court should not hesitate to adopt
necessary purposive approaches, in line with Northern Milk Vendors Association Inc.
v. Northern Milk Ltd [1988] 1 NZLR 530.’
On the importance of protecting consumers rather than competitors, see also
Ellis, J. and Professor M. Brunt, Clear Communications Ltd. v. Telecom Corporation
7judicial statements that competition law is intended to protect competition or
consumers, rather than particular competitors. Efficiencies by a dominant firm
benefit consumers and the economy as a whole, even if they harm competitors.
Their interest must not be ignored. Conduct that has no purpose or likely effect
other than to restrict output and raise price has no compensating benefits to
justify them.
For the last twenty years, the distinction between competition on the
merits and other exclusionary practices has been very important in the US. In
Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co,16for instance, the second circuit Court
of Appeals treated as lawful, taking advantage of the efficiencies provided by
vertical integration. Frances Hanks and Philip Williams17 have argued that the
test of ‘taking advantage’ used in Queensland Wire places efficiencies at the
heart of section 46. On no other basis am I able to draw the distinction between
competing on the merits and other exclusionary conduct. Even a firm without
market power would refuse supply where breaking the chain of production or
distribution increases cost or reduces quality.
I am, however, concerned that the judgment, if the words of Mason CJ
and Wilson J quoted above in the text above note 11 are followed literally, might
reduce the incentive to the initial investment. The issue did not arise in
Queensland Wire. The incentive of being the only producer of star pickets can
hardly have been an element in BHP’s decision to build a steel mill. It was only
one of nearly 60 products to be produced thereby. The incentive to make a
monopoly profit downstream might, however, well be important in other cases.
                                                                                                                                
of New Zealand Ltd (1992) 5 TCLR 166 from 194 and the Privy Council in Telecom v.
Clear, [1995] 1 NZLR 385, p.407, line 10.
16  603 F 2d 263 (1979).
17   In their outstanding article, `Implications of the decision of the High Court in Queensland
Wire,’ (1990) 17 Melbourne  Law Review, 437, 446. For later developments, see also Philip
L. Williams, ‘The exercise of market power: its treatment under the Australian and New
Zealand statutes’ in Ed David K. Round, The Australian Trade practices Act 1974 –
proscriptions and prescriptions for a more competitive economy,  Kluwer, 1994, 607, .610.
His article discusses the other Australian cases on ‘taking advantage of market power.’
8Philip Areeda stated at 3a) of his suggested principles that access should be
required only if it would increase competition by reducing price or increasing
output or innovation, which is unlikely when it would chill desirable activity –
here in making the original investment.18
As Hanks and Williams observe, where the efficiency of refusing access
is based on avoiding disruption of the industrial process, it is clear that a firm
without market power would refuse supply. So would a firm that wanted to
avoid free riding, which might chill the incentive for dealers to invest in
promoting its product (449 – 450). The same economic arguments apply when a
duty to supply by a firm with market power might deter other firms from
investing in other markets. Although in that case the supplier might well deal
even if the market were more competitive.
Both Hanks and Williams and Philip Areeda stress the economic
argument. Can the interpretation of `taking advantage’ in section 46 be limited
to include consideration of reducing incentives to the original investment?
In Queensland Wire, The High Court accepted that there may be
legitimate reasons for a monopolist to refuse supply.19 It may, however, have
been thinking of commercial matters such as the credit worthiness of the buyer,
inadequate services that might be expected of a dealer and so forth rather than of
incentives to the original investment.
Melway
Leave has been given to appeal to the High Court against the majority
judgment of the Full Federal Court in Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v. Robert
Hicks Pty Ltd.20 Melway Publications publishes a volume of street directories of
Melbourne each year. It now enjoys a substantial degree of power in the market
for street directories for the Melbourne area and has a market share of about
                                          
18 See also Areeda’s fifth principle.
19 Per Mason CJ and Wilson, pp. 586 lines 10 - 15.
20 20 May 1999. Available only on Austlii.
985%. From the beginning, some 30 years ago, it adopted the policy of
distributing only through wholesalers which each dealt with a particular segment
of the retail market – service stations, office stationers, authorised car dealers
and automotive parts dealers (para. 51). Notice of termination was given to one
dealer, which then requested supply of 30 – 50,000 copies, which it would have
sold mainly at the expense of the existing retailers. This was refused, and the
dealer alleged that the Melway Publications had taken advantage of its power in
the market for the purpose of
‘c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive
conduct in that or any other market.’
The Federal Court held that this infringed section 46. No appeal was
brought against the finding that the relevant market was street directories for
Melbourne and that Melway Publications enjoyed a substantial degree of market
power over it. The appeal to the Full Federal Court was limited to the
application of the words ‘take advantage for’ the prohibited purpose’.
In discussing the requirement of ‘taking advantage’, at para. 17, Heerey
J., dissenting, pointed to the need to prove a causal link between the market
power and the refusal to supply. Melway directories had been sold the same way
30 years ago, when Melway Publications must have had a small share of the
market. Another publication of the same firm, Sydway, was also being marketed
in a similar way, although its Sydney directories enjoyed a market share of only
10%. Consequently, Melway Publications was doing only what it did when or
where it had no market power. There was no causal link between any market
power and the refusal to supply. Melway Publications was not taking advantage
of its power in the market. Heerey J also pointed out that the sales that were
foregone would be at the expense of its other distributors. The case was different
from Queensland Wire since any hypothetical sale by BHP would have been at
the expense of a competitor, not of BHP.
10
The judge went on to make good use of the article by Hanks and Williams
and their view that efficiencies lie at the heart of the phrase ‘taking advantage.’
Where breaking a production chain would be costly, even a supplier with no
market power would refuse supplies. As Hanks and Williams also observed,
there are many kinds of efficiencies, including protecting distributors who invest
in promotion from those who take a free ride on it and are able to sell at lower
prices. Heerey J. took this small step beyond Queensland Wire in accepting that
efficiency encouraging a wholesaler or retailer to invest in promotion was
relevant. The step was small because a non-dominant firm might have refused
supply to protect its distribution system.
The majority of the Full Federal court, however, disagreed with Heerey J,
and applied  s. 46 to protect a competitor rather than competition. They ignored
the point that the sales requested might not have added to Melway Publications’
total sales and that, consequently, it might have refused supply in the absence of
market power. Unlike BHP, Melway held the copyright in its directories, so
Hicks could obtain them directly or indirectly only from Melway. From the facts
reported, it sounds as if the large market share of Melway Publications was due
to efficiently producing and supplying what customers wanted – the very result
the Act should promote.
I would like the courts to take an important further step and go beyond the
words of Queensland Wire21. I would like it to accept that a refusal to supply
may be justified on the ground that an obligation to supply would reduce the
incentive to the original investment, even if in a more competitive market,
supply would have been available. Each decision requiring supply makes the
particular market more competitive but, on a dynamic analysis, chills the
incentive to incur sunk costs in other emerging markets where the first mover
                                          
21 See the passage cited in text to note 11, or Dawson J. at p. 593, lines 29 and 30.
11
may acquire market power. It will not be necessary for the High Court to decide
on this further step in its judgment in Melway Publications, but it could.
AGL Cooper Basin Natural Gas Supply Agreements
The old problems of admitting and testing economic evidence, which
would be helpful in deciding how much protection is justified by the need to
induce risky investment have come to an end with the new rules of court for the
Federal Court derived from the experience of the Competition Tribunal (now
renamed ‘the Competition Tribunal’).22
The Trade Practices Tribunal in cases based on section 45 has emphasised
the importance of not reducing incentives to investment when considering
whether to authorise a long term contract on the basis of which considerable
sunk investment had already been made. Authorisation is not possible when
section 46 is at issue, but the judgment of Professor Brunt Mr. Aldridge and
Lockhart J. is helpful in stressing the importance of incentives to significant,
risky investment.
AGL Cooper Basin Natural Gas supply Arrangements,23 is the best
articulated judgment of the Tribunal about exclusive provisions in long term
contracts.24 The contract provided for the exploitation of the Cooper basin and
                                          
22 See Maureen Brunt  [1988] Fordham Corporate Law Institute 357, 363 - 366
23 (1997) ATPR 41.593, 16.02, para. 44216.
See comment by A.I. Tonking, ‘Long Term Contracts: When are they Anti-
competitive?,’ (1988) 6 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 13, especially at 19-23. He
sets out the particular terms more fully and criticises the Tribunal in several cases for failure to
adopt consistent conclusions. The other judgments also paid attention to the hold up problems
and the need for long term protection of significant investments, especially when demand was
not highly predictable.
24 The others are A C Hatrick Chemicals Pty Ltd, (1978) 18 ALR 129 and ATPR 40-057 and
Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd; Review of Notice re Koppers Pty Ltd (1981) ATPR 40-203. On all
three judgments of the Tribunal and on Kapuni, see the interesting article by A.I. Tonking,
Long-term contracts: When Are They Anti-competitive?’ He concludes that although the
judgments consider relevant factors, the results are hard to predict. He would prefer a more
systematic analysis of the exact terms of the agreement and its potential anti-competitive
effects on the basis of the four cases he considers.
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the supply of the gas thence to Sydney for thirty years. The most important
restrictions were:
1. a take or pay provision: the buyer was to take at least 80% of the
maximum quantity of gas the seller was required to supply, or pay for
it;
2. it agreed not to acquire gas elsewhere until it had taken the maximum
quantity and
3. the buyer agreed to give the producers the chance to sell more than the
agreed quantities, provided their terms were no less favourable that
any alternative offers.
After noting that major gas exploration contracts where capital
expenditure is amortized over 20 years or more, were common for sensible
commercial reasons, the Tribunal accepted that the earlier authorisation should
not be withdrawn even though it might have preferred detailed changes to its
terms.
It added some general comments at the end. It accepted that it was
required to look prospectively and that there was no likelihood of the particular
investment ceasing to be useful if the protection granted by the long term
contract were withdrawn. It said:
‘1. A distinction can be drawn between those long term contracts
that are necessary to sustain substantial, long lived, sunk investments, as
in this matter, and those long term contracts that create no such social
utility, but are, rather, an instrument of foreclosure.’
It referred to Tooth and Tooheys25 as an example of a long term sales
contract providing no benefit to the public.
‘2. We have no doubt that, speaking generally, there is social value
in the preservation of contractual commitments, and society proceeds on
                                          
25 [1979] ATPR 940 – 113.
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the basis that, in the broad, contractual commitments will be met. The
institution of contract goes hand in hand with the institution of property
rights which, in turn, gives rise to appropriate incentives for behaviour
that will be both efficient and fair. It is part of the web of
interconnectedness that characterizes society as a whole. Accordingly, we
reject the ACCC (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission)
view that, on the future with and without approach,26 contractual
commitments are “sunk” and can be disregarded.
3. We affirm, nevertheless, the appropriateness of the future with
and without test. Choices today with respect to the use of resources relate
to today and tomorrow, not yesterday. Our treatment of contractual
commitments will affect the investment decisions of the future and the
reliance that may be placed on long-term commitments.
4. It was a long term contract, the Letter of Agreement, that in the
beginning made possible a project that has given rise to benefit of the
public. This does not mean that all the detailed terms were necessary, or
that there is not the possibility of some anti-competitive terms having
been introduced. Hence we have to examine whether a less restrictive
contract would, in Dr. King’s phrase, have “done the job”. If a less
restrictive contract would suffice, both in respect of past obligations and
future obligations, the consequent detriment must be subtracted from the
benefit created. . . .
5. It is consistent with our methodology to revisit the past and ask
the rationale for the various provisions included at that time. A clause that
now seems anti-competitive might in earlier times have contributed to the
viability of the project. On the other hand, the rationale for a clause may
have been anti-competitive at the beginning.
                                          
26 The ‘with and without’ approach is a comparison of what has happened after the transaction
with what would have happened without it.
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6. We do not rule out the possibility that circumstances may have
changed so as to diminish the importance of certain contractual
protections to the viability of the investments. There is evidence of less
need, with current and future developments in the gas and transmission
markets, for contractual protection against opportunism and risk. As
opportunism, commercial alternatives have emerged for both the buyer
and seller, were either side not to fulfil its side of the bargain. As regards
risk, there are beginnings of developments in trade in financial
instruments and future commitments that can offer some protection. . . .’
The Tribunal, at 44,220, concluded that circumstances had changed since
the authorisation by the Commission in 1986 and it was necessary to decide
whether the authorisation should continue. It concluded, however, that it should
not remake the contract, but warned that in future parties should try to provide
only such protection as could be justified as necessary to make the transaction
viable.
Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act
I would like also argue that since the access regime was introduced in Part
IIIA of the Australian Trade Practices Act27 there is less need to impose an
obligation to supply under s. 46.28 The weakness of that argument is that the
interpretation of the legislation is not clear. It is clear that access to goods, as
opposed to services is not covered and the distinction between goods and
services is unclear. Moreover, the process of obtaining a right to access and the
                                          
27 Enacted as part of the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth).
28 A third party requiring access to a service, which it cannot negotiate, may request the
National Competition Council to make a recommendation that the service be declared an
essential facility. If the Council decides to make such a recommendation to the Minister, the
Minister may so declare the service with the consequence that third parties are entitled to
access. If the parties cannot negotiate acceptable terms, the ACCC may act as arbitrator and
settle the terms. From each of these steps there is an appeal to the Competition Tribunal and
thence, on points of law, to the Federal Court. There are two other paths to access: an access
undertaking given by the provider of a service and accepted by the ACCC and certification of
State and Territory access regimes.
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determination of the terms of dealing are complex and involve several
institutions. Moreover, many conditions limit the power of the Minister – the
service must be of national importance, there must be sufficient capacity to
supply the provider himself and third parties etc.
Sections 47 and 48
Refusals to supply are elements under other sections of the Act, which
will not be considered here. Section 47 forbids exclusive dealing29 when it has
the purpose, or, on balance, has or is likely to have the effect of substantially
lessening competition. Resale price maintenance is forbidden per se by section
48. Section 96 and 96A define resale price maintenance to include a refusal to
supply a price cutter.
New Zealand Law
A duty to supply under New Zealand law might have arisen in two ways.
The common law doctrine of prime necessity, however, was held by the Court
of Appeal30 to have been supplanted by section 36 of the Commerce Act in so
far as it applies to electricity. The problems of requiring access to facilities now
are far more difficult or arbitrary than those that arose in the medieval cases. So,
in so far as it holds that the doctrine of prime necessity no longer applies to
electricity, I welcome the judgment. I would have preferred it to have followed
the High Court which held that the doctrine had been replaced in relation to all
products.31 The appropriate charge for using the only wharf in a port could be
                                                                                                                                
29Which means a restriction on the acquirer of goods obtaining similar goods
elsewhere. A refusal to supply on the ground that the other party has or has
agreed not to apply similar goods elsewhere counts as a refusal to supply.
30  Vector Limited v. Transpower New Zealand Limited, 31 August 1999, obtainable on
www.austlii.edu.au
31 Mercury Energy Ltd v. Transpower New Zealand (HC) 8 TCLR 554, 583 line 17, Williams
J. and Dr. M. Brunt.
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easily determined by reference to prices in more competitive ports nearby. The
appropriate charge for access to a national electricity grid or a local telephone
loop is far more difficult to set and supervise.
The other possible source of a duty to supply is section 36.32 More than one
Zealand judgment has stressed the value of construing the Commerce Act in line
with the Australian Law.33 So, the Australian developments are important also in
New Zealand.34 Moreover, the New Zealand tradition is to construe legislation in
accordance with its purpose35 to a greater extent than has been customary in
                                                                                                                                
‘Whilst the Court is not unaccustomed to dealing with matters of complex economic
theory, pricing methodologies and the like, and whilst it has mechanisms available to assist it
in deciding these questions, it was common ground that the setting of pricing principles would
be  matter of considerable complexity, ill-suited to the adversarial process and one which
would require to be regularly if not continuously repeated. It may not be overstating the
position to say that if the court became involved in such a process, it could become
permanently involved. Given that the doctrine has never been invoked in this area in this way
over the past dozen years or so, it would be a startling innovation for this court now to assume
and devote a considerable amount of resources to an ongoing supervisory if not regulatory role
of major complexity in this sector of the electricity industry . . . . Had Parliament intended the
Court to fulfil such a role, in our view it would have said so unmistakably clearly.
We therefore take the view that the Acts under discussion “conceal for the area [they]
cover the texture underneath and eclipse the doctrine of prime necessity.’
32  Section 36 prohibits a person who has a dominant position in a market from using that
position for the purpose of
a) restricting the entry of any person into any market,
b)  deterring or preventing any person from engaging in competitive conduct in any
market or
c) eliminating any person from any market.
33 E.g. Apple and Pear Board v. Apple fields Ltd.[1989] 3 NZLR 158, per Cooke. J,  p.164,
and at p. 173, Richardson J spent some time analysing the Australian case law, as did the
Privy Council, [1991] NZLR 257, 262. See also, Telecom Corp of New Zealand Ltd. v.
Commerce Commission & others, [1991] NZBLR 99,239, 102,358 and Auckland Regional
Authority v. Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland Airport) Ltd. [1987] 2 NZLR 647, 669.
34 In Telecom Corporation of New Zealand ltd. v. Clear Communications Ltd.[1995] 1 NZLR
385 at p.43, lines 53 – 56, the Privy Council adopted as the law of New Zealand the ratio of
Queensland Wire and said:
‘it cannot be said that a person in a dominant position “uses” that position for the
purposes of s. 36 unless he acts in a way which a person not in a dominant position but
otherwise in the same circumstances would have acted.’
35 Although the law goes back much further, the desirabilty of adopting a purposive approach
to complex new legislation was clearly stated in Northern Milk Vendors Association Inc v.
Northern Milk Ltd.’ [1988] 1 NZLR 530, 537, line 37. Cooke P. started his judgment by
saying:
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Australia. So it would be easier for the judges to permit justification of a refusal to
supply on the ground that to require supply would lessen the incentive to the
original investment and create problems in fixing and regulating the appropriate
compensation.
Either party to a case to be decided by the High Court under the
competition provisions of the Commerce Act may request that a lay member of
the court be appointed to sit with the judges. Most of the lay members are
economists very familiar with problems of competition policy. So the economic
considerations are often more clearly expressed by the High Court than in the
three cases in the Court of Appeal, which are of varied quality.
Magic Millions
The passage about competition on the merits from Dawson J.’s judgment
in Queensland Wire set out above in the text to note 13 was quoted with
approbation by Tipping J. in the New Zealand case, Magic Millions.36 He added:
-
‘I would venture the following proposition. It is not a breach of
section 36 if a person albeit with a dominant position, simply acts in a
competitive manner. It would be an irony if such conduct could be
                                                                                                                                
‘This is one of a growing number of recent cases partly in a category of their
own. They are cases where, in the preparation of new legislation making sweeping
changes in a particular field, a very real problem has certainly not been expressly
provided for and possibly not even foreseen.
The responsibility falling on the courts as a result is to work out a practical
interpretation appearing to accord best with the general intention of Parliament as
embodied in the Act – that is to say, the spirit of the Act. In doing so we have to bear
in mind that freedoms such as that of the owner of a business to conduct the business
as he sees fit are not to be restricted unless it clearly appears that this must have been
the intention of the legislature. Obviously therefore a great deal turns on the need for
the courts to appreciate and give weight to the underlying ideas and scheme of the Act.
. .
As will be seen, the present case . . . is one in which we have found the long
title is of some help, Whether or not the legislature has provided those aids, the Court
must try to make the Act work while taking care not themselves to usurp the policy
making function, which rightly belongs to Parliament.
36 New Zealand Magic Millions Ltd. V. Wrightson Bloodstock Ltd., [1989] 1 NZLR 731, 761.
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attacked because it is competition, which the Act is designed to promote.
However if someone with a dominant position takes some action for a
purpose prescribed by section 36 then clearly they are using their
dominant position in a way which s. 36 prohibits.  The line may well be a
fine one in certain cases but it will be a matter of fact and degree and
ultimately of judgment in the individual case whether the line between
what one might call legitimate competition and illegitimate competition
has been crossed.’
I agree with the first two sentences, but find the last sentence unhelpful. Judges may
refer to the need for judgment when they cannot articulate the appropriate criteria.
Competition on the merits is normally for the purposes listed in section 36. All competition is
exclusionary. What should differentiate competition on the merits from other exclusionary
conduct is that the efficiencies and incentives to efficient investment outweigh the
exclusionary effects.
Aukland Regional Authority
One of the earliest judgments delivered under the Act of 1986 was
Auckland Regional Authority v. Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland Airport) Ltd.37
The ARA gave concessions to Avis and Hertz to rent out their cars from the
terminal building on the basis that no third company would be granted a similar
concession. Budget claimed that ARA was using a dominant position in the
market of granting concessions for the purpose of restricting entry of other
persons, such as Budget, into the market of renting out cars from the terminal
building.
ARA was clearly dominant. Mr. Gaunt, as he then was, cited some of the
American cases requiring access to a bottleneck facility. The High Court
accepted that a gateway facility is likely to beget a separate and identifiable
geographic market. It held that ARA’s motive in granting semi-exclusive
franchises might have been to maximise its income from granting concessions,
but it also had the purpose of deterring entry by Budget.
                                          
37 [1987] 2 NZLR 647, 678.
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The Court concluded that the agreement to limit the concessions to two
infringed section 36. It did not consider the important middle concept: the ‘use
of’ market power although, clearly, the grant of a semi-exclusive franchise might
come within it. The High Court made it clear that the ARA still had discretion to
admit or exclude Budget, but no shortage of space or other justification for
excluding it had been alleged.
Where a body with government power has power to grant franchises, it is
particularly important that other entrants should not be excluded without good
reason. I doubt whether the incentive to build the airport at Auckland was
affected by the need to consider Budget’s application on its merits. Indeed the
need for a government licence may lead to super-dominance, which in Europe,
may be a reason for imposing a more onerous duty to supply.
Clear v. Telecom – inter-connection
In Clear v. Telecoms Corporation of New Zealand,38 the question arose as
to the charge that the incumbent privatised operator of telecommunications
services might make to Clear, the new entrant, for connection to the local loop.
The incumbent, Telecom Corp. admitted that it was dominant over the local loop
and had a duty to provide interconnection for a new entrant. The only issue was
the criteria for charging. The High Court at p. 194 started its construction of s. 36
by quoting from Judge Posner in Olympia Equipment Leasing Co v. Western
Union Telegraph Co:39
‘Opinion about the offence of monopolisation has undergone an
evolution. Forty years ago it was thought that even a firm with a lawful
monopoly . . . could not be allowed to defend its monopoly against
would-be competitors by tactics otherwise legitimate; it had to exercise
special restraint – perhaps, indeed, had to hold its prices high to
encourage new entry. . . . Later, as the emphasis of antitrust policy
                                          
38 [1992] 5 TCLR 166, 194, Professor Maureen Brunt and Ellis J.
39 797 F 2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986} at p. 375.
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shifted from the protection of competition as a process of rivalry to the
protection of competition as a means of promoting economic efficiency,
it became recognised that the lawful monopolist should be free to
compete like everyone else; otherwise the antitrust laws would be
holding an umbrella over inefficient competitors. “A monopolist no less
than any other competitor, is permitted and indeed encouraged to
compete aggressively on the merits”. . .Today it is clear that a firm with
lawful monopoly power has no general duty to help its competitors,
whether by holding a price umbrella over their heads or by otherwise
pulling its competitive punches. . . .’
The High Court went on to cite McGechan J. and Mr. Blunt in the first
Port Nelson case40 and Tipping J. in Magic Millions as well as Queensland Wire
for the propositions that sections 36 and 46 are intended to benefit consumers
rather than competitors. In Queensland Wire,41 the judges envisaged that even a
monopolist may refuse to supply for a ‘legitimate reason’.
The High Court in Clear v. Telecoms continued to quote Posner J. in
Olympia on the US essential facilities doctrine:
“The monopolistic-refusal-to-deal cases qualify rather than
refute the no-duty to help-competitors cases. If a competitor is also a
customer his relationship to the monopolist is not only a competitive
one. The monopoly supplier who retaliates against customers who have
the temerity to compete with him, by cutting such customers off, is
severing a collateral relationship in order to discourage competition.”
The High Court went on to quote the ratio decidendi of  Queensland
Wire and the link required between ‘use of a dominant position’ and the
prohibited purpose.  Eventually it decided that Telecoms was entitled to make a
high charge to Clear for inter-connection, equal to the opportunity cost – what
                                          
40 Union Shipping NZ Ltd v. Port Nelson Ltd [1990] 2 NZLR 662, 766.
41 P. 586.
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Telecoms lost through not providing the call itself: that is the price it would have
charged for the call less the cost saved by Clear performing part of the service.
 The Court of Appeal quashed the decision on the ground that it enabled
Telecom to charge a monopoly price42 but was, in turn, quashed by the Privy
Council.43 The Board referred to efficiency,44 justifications45 and the need to
protect consumers.46 It also observed that it would be hard to establish that
Telecom did not have an anti-competitive purpose when dealing with its hated
rival, Clear:47 the focus must be on ‘use of a dominant position’.
Kapuni Gas   
The New Zealand High Court was required in Shell (Petroleum
Mining)Limited v. Kapuni Gas Contracts Limited48 to decide whether a rather
similar agreement to that for the Copper Basin was contrary to section 27 or 36.
It recognised that
`there is now a recognisable trend for efficiencies to be considered
in terms of their pro-competitive effect. . . . We were also persuaded that
if the [sellers] retain part or all of the Kapuni field as a result of the court’s
decision they will have a greater incentive to prove up more reserves
which, on the evidence, may well exist.’
On the facts, however, it was not convinced that the exploration and efficiency
arguments sufficed to overcome the foreclosure of competition which arises
from the buyer’s unconstrained market power. It said that had it been asked to
                                          
42 The Commerce act does not make excessive pricing illegal. It prohibits directly only the use
of market power to exclude competitors
43 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand ltd. v. Clear Communications Ltd.1995] 1 NZLR
385.
44 End of p. 402, quoting from Olympia.
45 P. 403, lines 37 – 56. The Board confirmed that ‘it cannot be said that a person in a
dominant market position “uses” that position for the purposes of section 36 unless he acts in a
way which a person not in a dominant position but otherwise in the same circumstances would
have acted.
46 At p. 407, lines 43-45.
47 At p. 403, lines 5 – 12.
48 Unreported, but discussed by Ian Tonking in the article cited in note 20 above at p. 18.
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consider the matter earlier in the life of the contract, it might have authorised the
agreement for 5 or 10 years.
It is clear that the court accepted that the incentive to the original
investments was relevant in deciding whether an agreement infringed section
27.49 The court balanced the degree of foreclosure against the efficiencies made
possible by reducing the risk attached to the investment.
EC Judgments
In virtually all the cases since Hoffmann-la Roche v. Commission,50 the
ECJ has used the same definition of ‘abuse’ in article 82 (ex article 86):51
`The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the
behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to
influence the structure of the market where, as a result of the very
presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is
weakened and which through recourse to methods different from those
which condition [normal commercial operations]52 has the effect of
hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in
the market or the growth of that competition.’
                                          
49 Earlier the High Court had held that where an agreement does not substantially lessen
competition, there is no need for it to be authorised. Indeed in Fisher v. Payroll, [1990] 2
NZLR 731, where the public benefit was insufficient to warrant authorisation, it had held that
the exclusive agreement did not infringe section 27.
In the Cooper Basin case the Australian Tribunal was not asked to consider whether
the exclusive terms infringed section 45, only whether the Commission was right to withdraw
the authorisation.
50  Case 85/76, [1979] ECR 461.
51  The numbers of nearly all the articles of the EC Treaty were altered by the Treaty of
Amsterdam, which came into force on May 1, 1999.
Article 82 prohibits, as incompatible with the common market, the abuse by one or
more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or a substantial part of it
in so far as it may affect trade between member states.
52  This is a poor translation from the judgment originally drafted in French and translated into
the authentic language of the case, which was German, meaning competition on the merits.
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The Court of Justice of the European Communities, often referred to as
‘the ECJ’, however, has never attempted to define what is meant by competition
on the merits.53 Early judgments, such as that in Commercial Solvents54
condemned refusals to deal without considering whether the requirement to
supply increased competition or discouraged desirable investments. In those
days, most people thought that article 82 was intended to protect competitors,
especially smaller firms. Only in the last few years has the ECJ stated that article
82 is intended to protect consumers rather than particular competitors.
The Commission of the European Communities, whose task is to
administer the competition rules, has gone very far in applying an essential
facilities doctrine, requiring non-discriminatory access to sea and airports even
when there were other routes that might have served.
Magill55 marked the high water mark of obligations to supply. Magill
published one issue of a weekly comprehensive guide to the three tv stations that
transmitted in Ireland and Northern Ireland, but was successfully sued for
copyright infringement by the television stations which each published an
individual guide of its own programmes. The Court of First Instance (the CFI)
and the ECJ upheld a decision of the Commission against the television stations
for abusing their dominant position over the information in the listings and
preventing the production of a new product for which there were no substitutes
and for which there was demand. Both courts said that the circumstances were
exceptional.
The judgment caused a furore and has been narrowly construed by the
Commission’s legal service56 and by the Community Courts.57 In Oscar Bronner
                                          
53  Advocate General Fennelly did attempt to do so in Compagnie Maritime Belge v.
Commission. We still await the judgment of the E.C.J.
54 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano Spa and Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission, Cases
6 & 7/73 [1974] ECR 223, [1974] 1 CMLR 309, CMR 8209.
55 Radio Telefis Eireann and others  v. Commission, Cases C-241 and 242/91P, [1995] ECR I-
743, [1995] 4 CMLR 718, [1995] 1 CEC 400.
56 PMI/DSV, O.J. 1995, L221/34, [1996] 5 CMLR 220
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v. Mediaprint Zeitung- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH and others,58 Advocate
General Jacobs wrote an analytical opinion that was followed by the ECJ,
although less theoretical reasoning was expressed in the judgment.59
The Advocate General started from the proposition that most European
legal systems recognise the right to trade freely and choose one’s own
customers. He added that
` . . . the primary purpose of article 82 is to prevent distortion of
competition – and in particular to safeguard the interests of consumers –
rather than to protect the position of competitors.’ (para. 58)
This view, which has seldom been expressed so clearly in Europe, has
frequently been expressed in New Zealand and Australian judgments.60 From it
Jacobs A.-G. went on to say that refusals to supply should not be illegal unless
supply was needed to constrain market power in a connected market (para. 61).
He warned against reducing the inducement to significant investment
(para. 62) and explained the judgment in Magill partly on the ground that it was
hard to justify copyright protection for programme lists in terms of incentives for
investment (para. 63). At the end of his opinion he also stressed that
compensation must be payable when access is granted and that the amount is
difficult to determine and may require continuing regulation (para. 69).
                                                                                                                                
57  E.g., Tiercé Ladbroke v. Commission, T-504/93, [1997] ECR II-923, [1997] 5 CMLR 309
and European Night Services v. Commission, cases T-374, 375, 384 and 388/94, [1998] ECR
II-3141, [1998] 5 CMLR 718, [1998] CEC 955. Comment, V. Korah, [1998] ECLR 169.
58 Case C-7-97, [19998] ECR I-7817, -1999] 4 CMLR 112.
59  Advocates General are full members of the ECJ of equal status with the judges. Often their
opinions provide fuller and more cogent reasoning, as they do not have to compromise.
Independent judges, who never dissent or write individual opinions, may not be able to agree
on the substance of their collegiate judgment but have to agree on its words, so much theory
gets cut, and even the minimum necessary to arrive at a result may be fudged. The judgment in
Oscar Bronner does not bear the signs of a compromise. It follows the result of the Advocate
General and may be treated as endorsing it.
60 See notes 14 & 15 above.
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He advocated careful balancing of the relative advantages and
disadvantages of introducing competition into the neighbouring market against
the reduction of the incentive to the initial investment and the problems of
continuing to regulate the compensation payable. Balancing these competing
benefits has much to be said for it, rather than the all or nothing test of ‘using’ or
‘taking advantage of’ a dominant position, which does not consider the weight
of each consideration.
Like Advocate General Fennelly in Compagnie Maritime Belge, Mr.
Jacobs suggested that, where a dominant position is particularly strong, there
may be wider duties to help competitors. The Courts and Commission61 in
Europe may be developing a concept of super-dominance (para. 65). Many of
the cases have involved a duty to supply by a firm enjoying exclusive rights
under national law. Where a facility has been paid for by the state, it is
particularly hard for a newcomer profitably to duplicate it (para. 66). Moreover,
the need to protect incentives to investment may be less important for
investment by the government. Buyers from the government on privatisation
must expect to be under a duty to give access.
Despite early judgments alleging a wide duty by a firm enjoying a
dominant position to supply those competing downstream, the EC authorities are
coming to recognise that the function of article 82 is to protect competition and
consumers rather than competitors. It is coming to be accepted, without much
help from the wording of article 82 of the EC Treaty, that a duty to supply
should be narrowly defined on economic grounds.
Conclusion
                                          
61  E.g., in Portuguese Airports, O.J. 1999, L69/31, [1999] CEC 2168, the Commission
stressed the exclusive right conferred on ANA to manage all the airports in Portugal and
imposed particularly strict obligations not to discriminate in favour of the Portuguese airline.
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In the US and in Europe the obligation for a dominant firm to supply
products or give access to a facility has been narrowed as it became clear that
competition law is intended to help consumers rather than particular
competitors. The passage trying to distinguish between competition on the
merits and other exclusionary conduct that I have quoted from Dawson J. in
Queensland Wire and which was accepted by Tipping J. in Magic Millions is
important. I hope that it may be the start of retrenchment of the duty of a
monopolist to supply in Australia and New Zealand.
It is clear from those cases that where interrupting an industrial process
would be inefficient, a dominant firm is not ‘using’ or ‘taking advantage of ‘its
market power if it refuses supply. The other economic objections to imposing a
duty to supply are:
1) reduction in the incentive to the original invention,
2) reduction in the incentive for exclusive dealers or retailers to invest in
promotion,
3) reduction of the incentive to duplicate the facility where this is
practicable and
4) the problems of continuous regulation to determine the terms of
dealing.
Heerey J. has recognised the second objection as a justification for not
supplying. My hope is that this will be accepted by the High Court in Melway
Publications62 and then in New Zealand.
The light handed regulation in New Zealand has left the parties to
negotiate the terms of dealing, subject to the control of the courts under section
36. As recognised by the Privy Council in Telecom Corporation of New
Zealand Ltd v. Clear Communications Ltd.63
                                          
62 Although the High Court can avoid the issue.
63  [1995] 1 NZLR 385, 390, lines 40 onwards.
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‘In the absence of guidance as to the principles applicable, the
parties were, as the High Court said, “negotiating in a fog’. It is a
regrettable fact that the decision of this appeal will only decide whether,
in the past, Telecom has abused its dominant market position. It will not
decide whether Clear’s past stance in negotiations was reasonable, let
alone fix the terms for interconnection.’
Some argue that what may be needed is a regulator that can decide the
terms of dealing in advance. The parties would not then be left to fix them
without guidance as to the criteria. They would be able to talk to the regulator
and he  would be able to issue a decision binding on the firms negotiating
access. Moreover, ex ante, a regulator can devise a price cap that leaves some
incentive to cost pruning by the dominant firm. There is no way that a court
deciding, ex post, whether a firm has infringed article 36 can do so. The
drawback might be regulatory capture. The regulator might become too
sympathetic to the views of the regulatees.
P. Williams and  Joshua S. Gans64 have devised a formula for assessing
compensation that would leave sufficient incentive to the original investment,
which they suggest should be adopted and publicised by the National
Competition  Council under Part III of the Australian Act.
The European courts and Commission are beginning to consider that the
extent of a duty to supply should depend on how dominant a firm may be.
Advocate General Jacobs has also required the balancing of the static advantage
of introducing competition to a market where there is a stranglehold monopoly
against the reduction in the incentive to invest in other markets and the
problems of continuing to regulate the compensation payable.
There seem to be grounds for the hope that efficiently producing
what consumers want to buy is now seen to be the objective of  s. 36 of the
                                          
64   ‘Efficient Investment Pricing Rules and Access Regulation.’ It and other papers can be
found on http:/www.mbs.unimelb.edu.au/gans/research.htm.
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Commerce Act, and that the courts may eventually be sufficiently convinced of
the need for appropriate incentives to limit the duty to supply either by
requiring that the monopolist has a real stranglehold on an important related
market, or by imposing terms of dealing that do not greatly reduce the incentive
to the original investment.
